Bird Dog Heritage
by
Jimmie H. Butler, Colonel, USAF, Ret.

Combat Reflections of a USAF FAC in the Vietnam War.
Part II
The pilots of the 23rd Tactical Air Support Squadron were
stationed at Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base in
northeast Thailand about 400 miles up-country from Bangkok. The
airbase commonly called NKP, Naked Phantom and Naked Fanny was
about eight miles west of the Mekong River separating Laos and
Thailand. The runway and parking ramps were perforated steel
planking (PSP), which was extremely slick when wet.
At NKP, Chic Randow and I became Cricket FACs and part of a
proud tradition of brave pilots taking small, unarmed aircraft
deep into enemy territory. Our squadron patch had been designed
by the Walt Disney Studios. Jiminy Cricket floated beneath his
umbrella complete with a UHF radio in its handle and looked for
the enemy.
Our mission was to fly surveillance over the parts of the Ho
Chi Minh Trail that snaked through the Steel Tiger sector of
Laos and the immediately adjacent areas of North Vietnam. We
were to look for, and direct attacks against, the big Russian,
Czech, and Polish trucks that carried weapons, ammunition,
people, and other supplies to the war in South Vietnam.
Although we were known as the Crickets, our squadron callsign
was Nail. Each FAC had a personal callsign such as Nail 12 or
Nail 59. On approximately 180 combat missions in the O-1 Bird
Dog, I wore a basic olive-drab flight suit and standard combat
boots. One calf pocket carried a vinyl escape and evasion (E &
E) map of Southeast Asia. In the other, I had a hunting jacket
made of camouflaged mosquito net. During an E & E exercise at
Snake School (USAF Jungle Survival School at Clark AFB,
Philippine Islands), the jacket had helped me evade a Negrito
tracker who had passed within about ten feet of my hiding place.
Over the flight suit, I wore a flak vest, a parachute, and a
survival vest with two emergency radios and a number of other
gadgets. I also had binoculars, a map case, and a kneeboard. I
wore a regular helmet and a pistol belt with a standard issue
.38 caliber Combat Masterpiece, a hunting knife, a canteen, and
some extra clips for my M-16. I carried my little bag of
bullets" with about fifteen more clips for my M-16, which had a
couple of clips on its strap and another in the weapon.
The O-1 Flight Manual warned that the O-1F had not been
structurally tested above 2,400 pounds. We did it fairly
regularly, especially when we added a combat photographer in the
back seat along with four White Phosphorous marking rockets
under the wings and all those M-16 cartridges.
During NKP's southwest monsoon season in the summer, Chic and
I were assigned temporarily to the US Marine Base at Khe Sanh,
South Vietnam. Chic came back with a hand grenade for me. I
added it to my bag. However, concerns about getting
unceremoniously blown out of my O-1 caused me to wrap so much
tape around the grenade, I probably wouldn't have been able to
make it explode if I had needed it.
The squadron at NKP had great ground crews, and it seemed to
take about three or four airmen to load me in and all my gear. I
flew my first few Bird Dog missions with an unsettling feeling:
if I needed to step out while flying, I wasn't sure I could
reverse the loading process without those three or four airmen.
After a month or so, my attitude had changed. Instead of being
loaded in, the feeling became that of strapping on an O-1 and
becoming an integral part of the aircraft.
On most daytime missions, we flew over roads that were empty.
While the analysts at the DoD probably figured we were wasting
fuel over empty roads, the roads were empty because we were
patrolling overhead. So, without more lucrative targets, we
often directed airstrikes against the roads and potential truck
parks that were within 200 meters of a motorable road. Because
the North Vietnamese knew our Rules of Engagement limited our
attacks to the 400-meter corridor along roads we could see, the
NVA generally developed their truck parks well away from the
roads we could see. Access to and from the truck parks was on
camouflaged roads we couldn't see. The main roads were 60 to 120
miles from NKP. We flew about an hour en route each way and had
about an hour over the roads on most O-1 missions. To provide
some margin of safety, a flight of two O-1s was assigned to each
mission. The wingman flew random patterns about 500 feet higher
than the leader. The second O-1 helped intimidate the gunners.
If they didn't get both of us, the second FAC was going to call
in help and try to rain bombs on the gunners who had fired. The
dense concentrations of 37mm AAA around the fords, mountain
passes, etc., had an effective range of 5,600 feet. The AAA had
shot down three Bird Dogs in the previous three weeks, so the
Nail FACs were directed to fly their O-1s at least 5,600 feet
above the ground in the high-threat areas. The 37mm shells came
at us in groups of about 60 if a four-gun emplacement fired. The
shells exploded on contact, and a single hit was likely to blow
a hole at least three feet in diameter. Check your Cessna and
see where you might be able to give up that much sheet metal and
keep flying. So most of our FAC missions were flown at about
6,000 and 6,500 feet. I used a pair of 7x35 binoculars, but we
seldom saw what the North Vietnamese wanted to keep hidden under
the jungle canopies.
Once we reached the Trail, we had another rule that probably
produced the highest percentage of passenger air sickness of any
USAF aircraft. We seldom flew more than ten seconds in a
straight line, often rocking from 45-degrees of bank on one side
to maybe 60 degrees on the other. (Try that for an hour with
your spouse in the back seat and see how long your marriage
lasts.) One morning I took an A-1 Skyraider pilot along to look
for one of his buddies who had blown off a wing the previous
night trying to drop some fancy munitions. We rocked around for
about an hour in a couple of miles visibility. Afterward the
fighter pilot told me that was the first time he'd ever been
sick in any aircraft. I never learned how the combat
photographers who went along on many O-1 missions solved the
problem, but they did.
In the next installment, you'll learn that all close calls in
an O-1 Bird Dogover the Ho Chi Minh Trail didn't come just from
enemy antiaircraft artillery.
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